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A RESPONSE TO SWINBURNE'S LATEST DEFENSE 
OF THE ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM 
Kent Reames 
This paper responds to Swinburne's recent article "Dualism Intact," which defends 
his argument for a body/soul du'llism. It pays particular attention to his defense 
against the charges of Alston and Smythe, especially the appeal to the "quasi-
Aristotelian assumption," on which the essence of a thing is necessary to its being 
the thing that it is. I argue that this defense does not save the argument, but only 
makes clear that its apparent plausibility rests on an ambiguity between two under-
standings of the nature of logical possibility. Swinburne's argument draws on and 
requires both understandings at different points in his argument, but the two are 
incompatible at the key point. 
In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy,' Richard Swinburne restates and defends 
against several attacks his earlier argument, originally given in chapter 8 of The 
Evolution of the Sou/,' for body / soul dualism. In this paper, I look in particular at 
his defense of the argument in response to the charges of William P. Alston and 
Thomas W. Smythe. I will argue that Swinburne's defense does explain why 
Alston and Smythe's argument does not succeed, but that precisely in so doing it 
opens the argument to another line of attack. 
1. Summarizing Swinburne's argument 
The original argument is quite straightforward. Given (p. 69) 
p = 'I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984' 
q = 'My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984' 
r = 'I have a soul in 1984' 
s = 1 exist in 1985' 
x ranges over all consistent propositions compatible with (p and q) and 
describing 1984 states of affairs. 
(x) = 'for all propositions x' 
o = 'it is logically possible that'; & = 'and'; - = 'not' 
Swinburne puts forward three premisses: 
(1) P 
(2) (x) 0 (p & q & x & s) 
(3) - 0 (p & q & -r & s) 
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(1) states simply that 1, a conscious person, exist in 1984. (2) says that it is logical-
ly possible that my soul (that is, that part of me which makes me me) will sur-
vive my bodily death (which will occur at the last moment of 1984) and live into 
1985, no matter what other conditions obtain in 1984. Of course, there is nothing 
special about the moment of transition from 1984 to 1985; the claim is a general 
one. (2) may thus be restated more simply as a claim that it is logically possible 
that I will survive my bodily death. (3) claims that it is not logically possible that 
I survive my bodily death unless I have a soul. 
From (2) and (3) it follows, according to Swinburne, that my lack of a soul (-r) 
does not fall within the range of propositions denominated under x. And since -
r describes a 1984 state of affairs, -r is not compatible with (p & q). 
(4) - 0 (p & q & -r) 
Since whether or not I am killed at the last instant of 1984 is obviously irrelevant 
to whether or not I have a soul during the rest of 1984, q can be dropped, leaving 
(5) - 0 (p & -r) 
or 
(6) p->r. 
My conscious existence in 1984 (or at any other time) implies that I have a soul. 
In their response to this argument, Alston and Smythe grant that "the sur-
vival of a human person ... in a wholly different body, or in disembodied form, is 
logically possible."3 However, they argue, this logical possibility is entirely com-
patible with one's in fact having no soul: "if it is conceivable that I am partly a 
soul, why would it cease to be conceivable if in fact I am only a body?"4 That is, 
the conceivability of my soul-possession, like conceivability in general, does not 
rest on any contingent state of affairs in the world, and hence certainly not on my 
actual soul-possession. They speculate that Swinburne has made an all too com-
mon error surrounding issues of logical necessity, confusing the necessity of the 
consequence with the necessity of the consequent.' 
Swinburne's defense of the soundness of the argument relies on what he calls 
"the quasi-Aristotelian assumption" (71), which states that a thing's continuity 
requires that it "continue to be made at least in part of some of the same stuff of 
which it was made previously" (68). If my desk tomorrow is the same desk as 
today, it must contain some of the same stuff. In other words, the desk has an 
essence; it is its essential features which continue in existence over time." Given 
this assumption, Swinburne continues, if I am only a body, then I am necessarily 
only a body, and could not have been otherwise. He cites Kripke as follows: 
"'Supposing this lectern is in fact made of wood, could this very lectern have 
been made from the very beginning of its existence from ice, say frozen from 
water in the Thames? One has a considerable feeling that it could not."" More 
generally, the actual essence of a thing - in the case of the desk, its made-from-
woodness - is necessary to its being the thing-which-it-is; if it were made from 
something else, it would be something else. In the case of humans and souls: if 
my essence in fact is my soul, then that essence could not logically have been 
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other than it is. In general, it is not logically possible that a thing's essence be 
other than it in fact is. In short, when we are talking about essences, given the 
quasi-Aristotelian assumption, possibility implies actuality. 
Now, Swinburne does not put the point quite so bluntly, so it is perhaps 
worth taking a moment to make it clear that this is indeed what he means to say. 
In the original argument, Swinburne had stated what he had shown thus: 
"From the mere logical possibility of my continued existence there follows the actual 
fact that there is now more to me than my body .... "8 Again, as an introductory 
comment to his argument against Alston and Smythe's rejection of his original 
argument, Swinburne writes: "Alston and Smythe make what is in effect a claim 
that no mere assertions about logical possibility could have any tendency to 
show what I in fact am (e.g. that I am not only a body). But given the quasi-
Aristotelian assumption ... , their claim must be false." (71) When we are talking 
about essences, given the quasi-Aristotelian assumption, possibility implies actu-
ality. 
Moreover, it seems clear that this is the point of the original argument as well: 
it moves from the logical possibility of my possessing a soul to its actuality. 
Because on Swinburne's account, dualists define the soul as "the part of the per-
son which is necessary for his continued existence,"9 his premise 
(2) (x) 0 (p & q & x & s) 
(it is logically possible that I survive the destruction of my body), is already a 
claim that it is logically possible tlUlt I have a soul which may survive my body. 
The rest of the argument then moves from the logical possibility that I have such 
a soul, to its actuality. 
In short, Swinburne argues that, within certain limits, possibility implies actu-
ality. With respect to the particular question of soul-possession, he argues that it 
therefore follows from the logical possibility that humans have souls, that they in 
fact have them. 
2. Swinburne on the nature of logical possibility 
and the quasi-Arisote/ian assumption 
In preparation for my response to Swinburne, 1 want to focus on the notion of 
logical possibility operative in his argument. What I call the "normal" under-
standing of logical possibility includes something like the following. Possibility 
is wider than actuality; in other words, the actual is a proper subset of the possi-
ble. Certain things exist, but they might not have existed; their existence is con-
tingent rather than necessary. In short, normally, possibility does not imply 
actuality. 
Swinburne, of course, has no stake in denying any of these claims as general 
philosophical propositions. But he does deny them with respect to a certain 
restricted set of claims. This is what his invocation of the quasi-Aristotelian 
assumption, backed up by reference to Kripke's argument, is intended to estab-
lish. Whatever essence a thing has, it has it necessarily. Within the realm of 
essences, Swinburne holds that in an important sense the actual is not a proper 
subset of the possible. Let us call this a restricted understanding of the nature of 
logical possibility. 
A RESPONSE TO SWINBURNE'S LATEST DEFENSE 93 
Swinburne's argument, then, seems to assume that although most of the time 
the nonnal understanding of logical possibility applies, it does not do so all the 
lime; when we are talking about the essences of tlungs, it is the restricted under-
standing which applies. I want to emphasize that I have no problem with this. 
At least, it is a comprehensible way of talking, and it may help us to solve or at 
least think more clearly about particular problems. Let us therefore grant HUs 
claim. As applied to humans, the claim is as follows: whatever the essence of 
the human actually is, whether that be body alone, or body-pIus-soul, or soul 
alone, it is the only essence that the human could possibly have. 
3. Response to Swinburne 
But while I have no problem with making this intellectual move, it is nonethe-
less a move which changes the shape of the nature of logical possibility in ways 
which undercut Swinburne's argument. In particular, my thesis is that once the 
move is made, Swinburne's claim that it is logically possible that the essence of 
the human includes a soul is an arbitrary claim which he has given us no reason 
to accept. In other words, Swinburne's defense of the soundness of his argument 
undercuts the argument's key premise. 
I will pursue this argument in two stages. First, I will argue that from the 
quasi-Aristotelian assumption itself, and indeed from the validity of 
Swinburne's original argument, nothing follows about the actual nature of the 
human. Parallel reasoning can prove, given the premise that it is logically possi-
ble that I do not have a soul, that in fact I do not have a soul. If we want to know 
which is the correct description of the actual essence of humans, with-a-soul or 
without-, we will need to turn from a formal consideration of the argument to 
the particular content which Swinburne claims it ought to have. So in the second 
stage, I will take this up, arguing that Swinburne's attempt to ground the superi-
ority of his claim (2) over a materialist version by appeal to apparent conceivabil-
ity fails, because on the restricted understanding of logical possibility, apparent 
conceivability is not evidence for logical possibility. 
3a. The parallel argument 
The parallel argument goes as follows: 
p' I exist in 1997 
q' My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1997 
r' I do not have a soul in 1997 
s' I do not exist in 1998 
x' names all states of affairs compatible with (p' & q') 
Given these symbols, 
(1') p' 
means only that I exist. 
(2') (x') 0 (p' & q' & x' & s') 
94 Faith and Philosophy 
means that it is logically possible, given all states of affairs compatible with my 
existence up until the last moment of 1997, that I will not exist in 1998. And 
(3') - 0 (p' & q' & -r' & s') 
means that if after existing in 1997 but having my body destroyed at the last 
moment of 1997, I do not exist in 1998, then it is not logically possible that I have 
a soul. From these, of course, by parallel reasoning, it follows that 
(6') p' -> r' 
- that is, that my existence implies that I do not have a soul. 
At least two objections will be raised to this argument. The first objection is as 
follows. One might reject (3'), by putting forward the possibility that in 1997 I 
had a soul, but for reasons completely independent of my bodily death my soul 
too perished at exactly the same moment my body did. Perhaps God annihilat-
ed it. If so, then (p' & q' & -r' & s') is logically possible. However, this objection 
to the parallelism of my argument with that of Swinburne is to the point only if it 
cannot be applied similarly to Swinburne's own argument. But it can be. 
Against Swinburne's original argument, one can object that his own 
(3) - 0 (p & q & -r & s) 
(I cannot survive the destruction of my body except by having a soul) fails to 
take note of the possibility that, despite my complete bodily destruction at the 
last instant of 1984, nonetheless I continue to exist without having a soul after 
God uses the same matter to miraculously reconstitute my body in another 
place, perhaps on another plane of existence, or otherwise intervenes to ensure 
my survival. 
To this, it may be objected that God's keeping my body alive in another place 
or on another plane counts as the continuation of my bodily life, and hence my 
body was not really destroyed at all in the requisite sense. But I take it that the rel-
evant question is whether or not I can survive this earthly life. Perhaps my body 
will be changed radically. As Paul says, we will have "spiritual bodies" after the 
resurrection. A materialist might want to say that in this life we are only bodies, 
but that nonetheless after the eschatological resurrection of the body, we will be 
miraculously reconstituted as spiritual bodies, bodies which are (say) the same in 
essence (made of the same "stuff') as our previous bodies, but without their cor-
mptibility. (To hold that all bodies are essentially cormptible would v:iolate at 
least many of the classic Christian treatments of the story of Adam and Eve.) 
Were this the case, a person who happened to die by bodily destmction the 
instant before the eschatological resurrection would thus be a counterexample to 
Swinburne's thesis that it is not possible for a purely material person to survive 
the destruction of his or her body.lO 
The point can be better stated as follows. Premise (2) ought to be understood 
to mean "It is logically possible that I naturally, as it were, which is to say without 
divine intervention, survive the destruction of my body." My (2') then denies 
this. For this is what is at stake in having a soul. If I survive my bodily destruc-
tion, but only by a miracle of God, which breaks into the natural order of things 
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under which I would not have survived my bodily destruction - an order of 
things which holds, let us say, for every other sentient being in the history of the 
universe - then it would be stretching things to say that before that miracle I 
had a soul. In this sense, the objection to (3') fails. The point is not what may 
happen in exceptional circumstances, but what happens most of the time, or at 
least what could happen without invoking supernatural assistance. If I have a 
soul, I "naturally" survive my bodily death - or at least I intrinsically have the 
potential to survive without divine assistance. If not, I lack that potential. 
The second objection to my attempted construction of a parallel argument is 
that it begs the question against Swinburne. Swinburne says that Alston and 
Smythe beg the question when they object to Swinburne's premise 
(2) (x) 0 (p & q & x & s) 
by inserting an "x" - namely, "I am essentially material in 1984" - which they 
claim is compatible with (p & q) and nonetheless makes (2) false. (That is, if I am 
essentially material, it is not logically possible that I survive the destruction of 
my body.) Swinburne replies to this contention as follows. 
"The claim ... that any x of the above type [that is, like Alston & Smythe'S] 
is compatible with (p & q) amounts to the denial of my conclusion. Now it 
is true that my argument will not convince anyone who claims to be more 
certain that the conclusion is false than that the premises are true. But then 
that does not discredit my argument-for no argument about anything 
will convince someone in that position." (71) 
Alston and Smythe thus beg the question against Swinburne. Does my parallel 
argument do so as well? It does not, because it does not assert anything about 
the reality of the objects in question. I am not more certain that Swinburne's con-
clusion is false than that his premises are true; I am bracketing that whole issue. I 
am saying only that before we come to any conclusion about the relative adequa-
cy of dualism and materialism, we ought to be clear about what the argument 
presupposes about the nature of logical necessity. In other words, I am doing 
precisely what Swinburne suggests when, immediately after the sentences I just 
quoted, he writes: "My argument was designed explicitly for those prepared to 
set aside philosophical dogma concerned explicitly with the mind/body issue, 
and rely only on philosophical theses and intuitions about logical possibility 
relating to other or wider issues." (71) Setting aside any particular considera-
tions in favor of dualism or materialism, I have only argued that the appeal to 
logical possibility by itself can be used equally well to support either side. 
3b. Which argument is sound? Apparent conceivability and logiCilI possibility 
Given this conclusion, it is time to tum from the formal aspects of the argu-
ment to the content which Swinburne wants to give it. I will continue to focus 
on issues surrounding the nature of logical possibility rather than on dogma 
about mind/body issues. In particular, the key question is how we know 
whether something which purports to be logically possible is in fact logically pos-
sible. Swinburne suggests an answer to this question, but, I will argue, his sug-
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gestion is only valid with respect to the normal understanding of the nature of 
logical possibility, and not with respect to the restricted understanding which (we 
have granted) applies to arguments about the essences of things. 
Swinburne suggests that in order to show that a purportedly logically possi-
ble claim is in fact logically possible, we ought to give 
arguments which spell it out, which tell in detail a story of what it would 
be like for it to be true and do not seem to involve any contradictions, i.e. 
arguments from apparent conceivability. Apparent conceivability is evi-
dence (though not of course conclusive evidence) of logical possibility. (70) 
The arguments and stories go together. The argument is that it is conceivable 
that a human may survive the destruction of his or her body. "If anyone does 
not see that [conceivability] at first, a story can be told in a lot more detail of what 
it would be like for it to be true, which would help the reader to see it." (71) To 
come to see it is not something which requires a great deal of philosophi.cal train-
ing; Swinburne suggests "that most people not already having a firm philosophi-
cal position on the mind/body issue will grant my premises." (71) 
However, all of this is problematic. On the restricted understanding of logical 
possibility which Swinburne has told us applies to questions of essences, appar-
ent conceivability is not evidence of logical possibility. Both stories are apparent-
ly conceivable,l1 but only one of them (at most) is logically possible. This is the 
key point. Where logical possibility implies actuality, the assertion "It is logically 
possible that p and it is also logically possible that not-p" is self-contradictory, 
because it implies "p and also not-p."12 So although the two stories are both 
apparently conceivable, they are not both logically possible. When both sides are 
apparently conceivable, the conceivability of one side is not evidence for its logi-
cal possibility in the restricted sense. 
Once we understand this, it becomes clear that when properly understood 
Swinburne's claim (2), that it is logically possible (in the restricted sense) for a 
human to survive the destruction of his or her body, is not a claim which most 
ordinary people will affirm. They will affirm only that they can conceive of sur-
viving, that as far as they can tell they might survive, their bodily destruction. But 
this conceivability does not imply logical possibility, because it depends on the 
telling of a particular story which itself mayor may not be logically po~sible (in 
the restricted sense). Most people will say that they just don't know whether in 
that sense it is logically possible or not. 
In short, when logical possibility is understood in the restricted sense, 
Swinburne has given no reason whatever to affirm his claim (2), that it is logical-
ly possible for a human to survive the destruction of his or her body. The appar-
ent force of the argument rests on an ambiguity between the two sorts of logical 
possibility. 
None of this, of course, does anything to show that metaphysical dualism is 
false. It is still a conceivable, and in that sense a possible, account of human 
nature, however unpopular among contemporary philosophers. However, 
Alston and Smythe are correct: we need to know more about dualism than that 
it is conceivable if we are to know it to be actual.13 
Chicago, Illinois 
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NOTES 
1. Richard Swinburne, "Dualism Intact." Faith and Philosophy 13/1 (January 
1996), pp. 68-77. In my paper, page numbers in parentheses refer to this article. 
2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
3. William P. Alston and Thomas W. Smythe, "Swinburne's Argument for 
Dualism," Faith and Philosophy (1994), p. 127. 
4. Ibid, p. 130. 
5. Swinburne is correct, in Alston and Smythe's view, to hold that "my being 
only a body and my surviving without a body are not jointly logically possible," but this 
does not imply "that if I am a body, it is not logically possible that I survive without a 
body." Ibid, p. 129. 
6. The" Aristotelian assumption" is that this "stuff" is matter; the broader 
"quasi-Aristotelian assumption," which uses the broader term "stuff," simply allows 
that the relevant stuff can be non-material, e.g., souL 
7. Swinburne, op. cit., 72, quoting Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity" in (ed.) 
Milton K. Munitz, Identity and Individuation (New York: New York University Press, 
1971), p. 152. 
8. The Evolution of the Soul, 154, my emphasis. 
9. The Evolution of the Soul, 146. 
10. Of course, all this introduces specifically Christian notions, but that is hardly 
inconsistent either with Swinburne's project, or with some of his arguments. See, 
e.g., The Evolution of the Soul, 151: "We understand what is being claimed in fairy sto-
ries or in serious religious affirmations which affirm life after death" - and hence, 
whether or not we believe these stories or affirmations, we ought to take what they 
describe to be possible, and our philosophical theory ought to be able to make some 
sense of them. 
11. I can tell you a story which makes it apparently conceivable that humans 
have souls, but then someone else can tell you a story which makes it apparently con-
ceivable that humans do not have souls. Indeed, the existence of both sorts of stories 
is not only imaginable but real; we can and do imagine ourselves both as having a 
soul and as not having one. If only one side were apparently conceivable, there 
would be no argument between materialists and dualists in the first place. 
12. Tn other words, contrary to Alston and Smythe'S conjecture, Swinburne does 
not confuse the necessity of the consequence with the necessity of the consequent. 
On the contrary, he takes the unexpected step of asserting both that (a) it is not possi-
ble that I both have and do not have a soul, and that (b) if I have a soul, it is not possi-
ble that I do not have a souL In other words, it is precisely the move to the "restrict-
ed" understanding of the nature of logical possibility which allows him to evade 
their critique. 
13. I would like to thank Jamie Schillinger for his helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. 
